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To investigate how basic aspects of perception are shaped by acquired knowledge about the world, we
assessed colour perception and cognition in patients with semantic dementia (SD), a disorder that
progressively erodes conceptual knowledge. We observed a previously undocumented pattern of im-
pairment to colour perception and cognition characterized by: (i) a normal ability to discriminate be-
tween only subtly different colours but an impaired ability to group different colours into categories, (ii)
normal perception and memory for the colours red, green, and blue but impaired perception and
memory for colours lying between these regions of a fully-saturated and luminant spectrum, and (iii)
normal naming of polar colours in the opponent-process colour system (red, green, blue, yellow, white,
and black) but impaired naming of other basic colours (brown, gray, pink, and orange). The results
suggest that fundamental aspects of perception can be shaped by acquired knowledge about the world,
but only within limits.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
To what extent does our acquired knowledge about the world
inﬂuence how we perceive it?
The study of colour cognition—our ability to perceive, cate-
gorize, remember, and name colours—has long provided a test-bed
for this central and controversial question. Subjectively, colours
feel as though they are of the world—attributes of surfaces that are
sensed directly and automatically from the environment. We do
not feel as though we have learned how to perceive “green”, nor
does it seem that the way “green” looks should depend upon the
language we speak or the knowledge we have acquired about the
world. Foundational research in human colour cognition has ten-
ded to bear out such intuitions (Berlin and Kay, 1969): colour in-
formation is thought to be carried along three neurophysiological
channels, each corresponding roughly to an independent psycho-
physical dimension—a red/green channel, a blue/yellow channel,22
r Ltd. This is an open access articl
europsychologia.2015.01.010
published in the wrong issue.
the reader and for the con-
e use the original publicationand a black/white (ie light/dark) channel—and perceived colours
are thought to arise from patterns of stimulation across the three
channels (Hurvich and Jameson, 1957; Solomon and Lennie, 2007),
subject to corrective mechanisms that preserve colour constancy
under different conditions of illumination. It is commonly thought
that the degree to which different colours appear similar is de-
termined predominantly by such “bottom-up” stimulation (Born-
stein, 1973), that the words we use to refer to colours are strongly
constrained by such perceptual structure (Berlin and Kay, 1969;
Heider, 1972; Kay, 2005), and that the perceived similarities
amongst various colours are not amenable to change through
learning, experience, or language (Berlin and Kay, 1969).
Over the past two decades, however, this standard view has
been challenged on several fronts, including a sustained critique of
the methodology and the interpretation of results from seminal
studies (Saunders and van Brakel, 1997), failure to replicate some
of these early results in new studies employing adapted methods
(Roberson et al., 2000), and data from new cross-cultural (Davidoff
et al., 1999; Roberson, Davidoff et al., 2004), psychophysical
(Goldstone, 2006; Ozgen and Davies, 2002) and developmental
studies (Roberson et al., 2004). Much of this new research suggests
that the ability to discriminate and to discern similarities amongst
colours varies considerably depending upon the language one
speaks or the way one has learned to categorize colours (Gold-
stone, 2006; Ozgen and Davies, 2002; Roberson et al., 2000). Thise under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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2005; Kay and Regier, 2003, 2006), leading to heated debate re-
garding the validity of the standard theory. Saunders and van
Brakel (1997), for instance, write “In each subﬁeld… there are
respected local experts who have already made devastating criti-
cisms. What we have here is an apparently coherent study of the
type that most scientists would like to believe in, but is seriously
entertained only because people over-charitably assume that the
parts in which they are not experts are sound” (Saunders and van
Brakel, 1997, p. 169). The controversy has re-opened a very basic
question for cognitive science: To what extent does the structure
of the world shape our minds, and vice versa?
We report a new source of evidence addressing this question
through the study of colour cognition in a group of neurological
patients who are progressively losing their knowledge about the
world. Semantic dementia (SD) is a degenerative disease that de-
stroys anterior regions of temporal cortex bilaterally, producing
signiﬁcant impairments to language production and comprehen-
sion, recognition, and the ability to infer properties of objects and
events on the basis of their meaning (Warrington, 1975; Saffran
and Schwartz, 1994; Lambon Ralph et al., 1999; Patterson and
Hodges, 2000; Snowden, Thompson and Neary, 2004; Patterson,
Nestor, and Rogers, 2007; Guo et al. 2013). Despite these dis-
abilities, patients with SD perform well on tests of visual percep-
tion including colour discrimination (Barense et al., 2010; Lee
et al., 2007) and on most other tests of non-semantic cognitive
functioning (Barense et al., 2010; Hodges et al., 1998; Hodges et al.,
1999; Rogers et al., 2006). Moreover, until late in the disease
process, the selective brain atrophy that produces the disorder is
largely circumscribed within anterior parts of the temporal lobes,
typically sparing the posterior–inferior cortical regions such as V4
thought to support colour perception (Acosta-Cabronero et al.,
2011; Guo et al., 2013; Mion et al., 2010; Mummery et al., 2000;
Nestor et al., 2006). SD thus provides a unique opportunity to
investigate whether and how colour perception and cognition are
affected when general knowledge about the world degrades.
The few previous studies of colour cognition in SD suggest that,Table 1
Control/
Mean (SD)
Patients with semantic dementia
Ath NS WM A
Demographic
Age 64 71 57 6
Sex M F F M
Education 10 9 16 9
General neuropsychology
MMSE 28.8 (0.9) 5 8 19 2
ACE 93.8 (3.5) 9 12 30 5
Visual perception
Rey-Copy /36 34.2 (1.6) 21 34 36 3
VOSP Cubes /10 9.3 (1.5) 4 10 9 1
VOSP Dot count /10 9.9 (0.3) 10 9 9 1
Memory
Forward digit span 7.1 (0.9) 5 4 5 6
Backward digit span 5.4 (1.4) 2 3 4 4
Rey-Delayed copy /36 18.3 (5.2) 0 0 12 9
Semantic
WPM 0.99 (0.01) 0.19 0.02 0.28 0
Naming 0.97 (0.02) 0.05 0.02 0.28 0
PPT-Pic 0.98 (0.03) 0.06 0.75 0.85 0
Note: Bold font indicates impaired performance according to published cutoffs. Dashes
completing the colour battery. MMSE = Minnesota Mental-State Exam; ACE = Addenbr
Pyramids and Palm Trees Test.though knowledge of colour names deteriorates, other aspects of
colour cognition can be spared. Two papers have reported pro-
gressive colour anomia proportionate to the general degree of
semantic impairment (Haslam et al., 2007; Rogers, Patterson and
Graham, 2007), though a third reports that colour naming can be
normal in SD (Robinson and Cipolotti, 2001). Discrimination be-
tween even very similar colours appears unaffected in SD (Barense
et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2007), and one study has found preserved
ability to sort colour chips into categories, coincident with pro-
gressive colour anomia, in a single case of SD (Haslam et al., 2007).
To our knowledge, however, no prior work has systematically
evaluated multiple aspects of colour cognition in a case series of
SD patients.
In the current work, we assessed colour discrimination, cate-
gorization, perception, memory, and naming in case series of pa-
tients with SD. The results establish a previously undocumented
disorder of colour cognition in this group with strong implications
for theories about the interaction between knowledge and
perception.2. Experiment 1: Categorization and discrimination in an
oddball task
Previous research has shown that even patients with advanced
SD can successfully discriminate subtly different colours (Barense
et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2007). Colour perception, however, also
entails the ability to discern the similarities among discriminably
different shades of the same colour category. Experiment 1 as-
sessed both colour discrimination and categorization in SD using
an “oddball detection” procedure adapted from that employed in
the earlier work with SD.
2.1. Participants
Ten patients and 20 healthy age-matched controls participated
in the study. One patient was unable to complete the task due toN Ate JM IB RS FB JR
6 69 66 58 57 72 58
M M M M F M
20 15 11 16 16 20
6 1 24 23 18 23 20
6 5 48 40 – 63 29
5 36 36 32 29 36 36
0 10 9 9 10 9 –
0 10 10 10 10 10 9
7 7 8 7 7 8
5 7 5 6 5 6
8 17 4 11.5 10.5 –
.63 0.45 0.95 0.30 0.34 0.84 0.33
.38 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.09
.77 0.46 0.88 0.63 0.73 0.90 –
indicate that no data were available for the corresponding test within a year of
ooke's Cognitive Examination; VOSP = Visual Object and Space Perception; PPT =
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consensus and local criteria for SD; all had MRI-conﬁrmed cortical
atrophy concentrated in the anterior temporal lobes (as assessed
by a senior neurologist); and all showed the characteristic pattern
of impaired performance on verbal and non-verbal tests of se-
mantic memory, together with generally good performance on
other aspects of cognition including visuo-spatial perception and
colour discrimination. The results of standard neuropsychological
assessments for the patients are shown in Table 1. All patients
reported having normal colour vision prior to the onset of their
disease. Control participants were recruited from the volunteer
subject panel at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit in
Cambridge and were matched to the patient participants for age.
2.2. Hardware and stimuli
The oddball-detection task was programmed on a computer
using Visual Basic. Patients were tested in their own homes using a
Dell Latitude 110L laptop PC with an XGA liquid-crystal display
(LCD) set up in a well-lighted room. Control participants were
tested either on a desktop computer with a similar LCD display set
up in a well-lighted room at the MRC-CBU, or on the same laptop
as the patients. The performance of controls tested with the laptop
versus the desktop computer did not differ signiﬁcantly in any task
so controls were treated as a single group. Details regarding the
nature of the liquid-crystal display and control of colours with this
technology, including parameters used to generate stimuli in this
and the next experiment, are provided in Appendix I. Brieﬂy, the
display controls three “liquid crystal” ﬁlters at every pixel, each
controlling the intensity of light at a given peak wavelength, with
peaks around 450 nm (blue), 550 nm (green), and 650 nm (red).
Colours are speciﬁed by setting the states of these ﬁlters to a value
between 0 (ﬁlter completely blocks light at target frequencies) to
255 (ﬁlter allows complete passage of light at target frequencies).
Colour coordinates are speciﬁed in this parameter space.
2.3. Task
The task was modeled on prior work by other researchers
where the goal was to measure discrimination and categorization
(e.g. Petzold and Sharpe, 1998; Roberson et al. 1999). On each trial,
participants viewed four coloured squares on a computer display
and were instructed to click on the square that was a differentFig. 1. Stimuli and performance in the oddball task. (A) Examples of stimuli used in the D
In both cases the oddball is in the bottom left of the display, though in the experiment
proportion correct across controls and patients for the two trial types. Figures appear icolour from the rest.
2.4. Design
The test included 18 Discrimination and 18 Categorization
trials, presented on a computer screen in mixed random order. In
Discrimination trials, 3 of the 4 squares were identical in colour
whereas the “oddball” differed subtly. In Categorization trials, our
goal was to create arrays of discriminable colours with one item
reliably judged by healthy controls to belong to a different cate-
gory from the other three, and with the task equal in difﬁculty to
the Discrimination trials. Thus we aimed to create arrays in which
the different options were perceptually variable and discriminable
from one another, with an out-of-category oddball that was not
too perceptually distant from distractor items. To this end we
paired each Categorization array with one Discrimination array
and ensured that all items in the Categorization array were more
distant from one another in the colour parameter space described
earlier thanwere the discrepant items in the paired Discrimination
display. We further ensured that the oddball colour was equally
distant from the distractor colours in this parameter space. In a
pilot study with healthy age-matched controls using 20 arrays of
each type, we selected a subset of 18 pairs of Discrimination/Ca-
tegorization arrays closely matched for accuracy. Though the col-
our space used to construct arrays is not psychophysically con-
trolled for perceptual distance, this approach ensured that the
Discrimination and Categorization tasks were equally difﬁcult for
healthy controls. It also ensured that, among participants who
perform well on Discrimination trials, good performance on the
Categorization trials entails grouping discriminably different col-
ours together into categories.
2.5. Results and discussion
The most severely impaired patient (ATh) was unable to com-
plete the task. Of the remaining nine patients, all but one (ATe)
performed within the control range for the Discrimination trials.
As a group, patient accuracy did not differ reliably from controls
(mean for controls¼0.97; mean for patients¼0.92; p¼n.s. for
1-tailed between-subjects t-test; Fig. 1b). Of the 8 patients who
performed normally on Discrimination trials, half performed more
than 2 standard deviations below the control mean on Categor-
ization trials, and accuracy was reliably poorer for the wholeiscrimination (top) and Categorization (bottom) trials of the oddball-detection task.
the location of the oddball varied at random. (B) Mean and standard error of the
n colour in the online version of this article.
Fig. 2. Stimuli and performance in the match-to-sample task. (A) Examples of stimuli (left) and overall performance (right) in the match-to-sample task. The top example
has a target at pure red (leftmost choice) and distractors 12 degrees to the left and right of the target. The bottom example has a target at 24° with distractors at 36 and 48°.
Dots on the plot indicate the accuracy of individual controls (green) and patients (red) in simultaneous and delayed conditions; diamonds indicate the respective means.
Because some patients had identical scores there are fewer points shown than patients. (B) Top: Mean proportion correct in the delayed condition at each test point across
the spectrum for controls (black) and patients (white). Bottom: The line shows means and 95% conﬁdence intervals of the Z-scores for patient accuracy at each test point
plotted against the left scale. The bars show the proportion of patients with signiﬁcantly impaired performance at each test point plotted against the right scale. Triangles at
the top indicate the location of the red, green, and blue colour centers. (C) Mean proportion correct in the Simultaneous condition at each test point for controls (black) and
patients (white). D. Mean performance at the primary (red, green, blue) colour centers, and at one step (24°) and two steps (48°) from these, for patients and controls in
simultaneous and delayed conditions. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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mean¼0.86; po0.001 one-tailed t-test). Whereas controls were
equally accurate for Discrimination and Categorization trials, pa-
tients were reliably worse on Categorization trials (po0.03 two-
tailed paired-samples t-test). The results thus suggest that the
ability to discern differences in colour is largely intact in SD, but
the ability to group different colours together into categories is
impaired.3. Experiment 2: Perception and memory in a match-to-sam-
ple task
It is possible that the categorization impairment illustrated in
Experiment 1 arises from the anomia that is a presenting feature
of SD. For instance, controls may perform well by naming all col-
ours in the display and choosing the itemwith a different name—a
strategy unavailable to participants who cannot name all the col-
ours. Experiment 2, therefore, assessed perception and short-term
memory for colours using a match-to-sample paradigm that does
not require covert naming for good performance.
The motivation for this study stems from prior work showing
that, despite good performance on tests of visual perception and of
short-term memory for arbitrary materials, the ability to retain
visual representations of everyday objects over a short interval is
degraded in SD (Bozeat et al., 2003; Lambon Ralph & Howard,
2000; Patterson and Erzinclioglu, 2008; Rogers, Lambon Ralph,
Garrard, et al., 2004). For instance, such patients can copy line-
drawings of familiar objects adequately when directly observing
them, but are impaired when asked to reproduce the drawing
from memory after a ten‐second span. Moreover, the degraded
images produced by patients after a delay are not arbitrary but
highly systematic: visual properties that characterize the item’s
broad conceptual domain—such as the legs, eyes, and mouths of
animals, the wheels on vehicles, or the handles of tools—are lar-
gely preserved, or even incorrectly added in, as when the patient
depicts both forelegs and hindlegs in a drawing of a duck. Prop-
erties that individuate semantic neighbours—such as the humps
on camels, the udders of cows, or the slots of a toaster—are very
frequently omitted. Thus the patients appear able to retain only
the most prototypical attributes of familiar visually-presented
items over a short delay. In the current task, we assessed whether
the same is true of short-term memory for colours.
3.1. Participants
The same 10 patients and 20 healthy age-matched controls
from Experiment 1 completed the experiment.
3.2. Materials and procedure
The match-to-sample task was programmed on a computer
using Visual Basic. Patients were tested in their own homes using
the same laptop PC set up in a well-lighted room. Control parti-
cipants were tested either on a desktop computer with a standard
LCD display set up in a well-lighted room at the MRC-CBU, or on
the same laptop as the patients. The performance of controls
tested with the laptop versus the desktop computers did not differ
signiﬁcantly in any task so controls were treated as a single group.
Colour parameters were speciﬁed as noted in Experiment 1 and
further explained in the Appendix.
3.3. Task
On each trial participants viewed a coloured square (the sam-
ple) at the top of a computer screen, with a target square (identicalin colour to the sample) and two distractor squares (neighboring
colours on the spectrum) appearing in random order below
(Fig. 2a; left-hand items along the bottom are identical matches in
this example while the other two options are distinct neighbors on
the spectrum). From the 3 lower squares, participants were in-
structed to select the one that exactly matched the sample. The
experiment began with three very easy practice trials to ensure
participants understood the task.
3.4. Design
In the Simultaneous condition, all 4 squares appeared together
on the screen against a white background, so performance mea-
sured the ability to detect that target and sample are identical and
that target and distractors are different. In the Delayed condition,
the sample appeared for 1 s against a white background, then was
replaced by a blank white screen for 3 s after which the 3 options
appeared, so performance here also assessed short-term memory
for the sample colour.
A fully saturated and luminant spectrum was generated using
the procedure described in Appendix 1. From this spectrum we
selected 15 points to be sample colours, beginning with the red
center (ﬁlter at 650 nm fully open and other ﬁlters fully closed)
and spaced at regular intervals in the ﬁlter parameter space in-
dicated by the points on Fig. 2b. Distractor colours included these
15 points along the spectrum plus an additional 15 selected from
the midpoints between the samples in the ﬁlter parameter space.
The samples include instances where each ﬁlter is fully open and
the other two are fully closed; we will refer to these as the red
(650 nm ﬁlter open), green (550 nm ﬁlter fully open) and blue
(450 nm ﬁlter fully open) colour centers respectively. Each sample
appeared in 3 separate trials—once with two distractors that were
immediate neighbours toward the red end of the spectrum, once
between the two adjacent distractors, and once with two dis-
tractors that were immediate neighbours toward the blue end.
Thus the full test included 45 trials in each of the Simultaneous
and Delayed conditions.
We note that distances in the ﬁlter parameter space are not
psychophysically normalized, so that a ﬁxed distance in this space
may be easier to perceive or remember in some parts of the
spectrum than others. For this reason, we take the behavior of the
healthy controls at each sample point as the normative behavior
against which to compare the patient data. The central question is
whether the controls and patients behave similarly or differently
in the Immediate and Delayed conditions, both in their overall
performance across colour samples and at each sample point
across the spectrum.
3.5. Results and discussion
In the Simultaneous condition, all patients except the most
severely impaired case (ATh) showed performance within the
normal range (right side of Fig. 2a). As a group the patients did not
differ signiﬁcantly from controls on this condition (control
mean¼0.94, patient mean¼0.93, p¼n.s. for one-tailed t-test). In
the delayed condition, 4 of 10 patients performed below the
control range, and as a group the patients were signiﬁcantly im-
paired in this condition (control mean¼0.76, patient mean¼0.62,
po0.001 one-tailed t-test).
This impairment did not, however, affect all colours equally.
Fig. 2b shows, for the Delayed condition, the average proportion
correct for patients and controls at each test point. Controls per-
formed least well at the red, green and blue centers, and best for
colours falling near the midpoints deﬁned above. (Note that the
exact midpoints between colour centers did not appear as sam-
ples; instead samples appeared bracketing either side of each
T.T. Rogers et al. / Neuropsychologia 76 (2015) 276–288 281midpoint). Patients with SD showed the reverse saw-tooth pat-
tern, performing best in the red, green, and blue centers, and worst
in the intermediate regions.
For a quantitative assessment of these data, we computed the
control mean accuracy and variance at each target point. From
these we calculated Z-scores for each patient’s accuracy at each
target point, then plotted conﬁdence intervals for the mean
Z-scores across patients. The results are shown in the bottom
panel of Fig. 2b (left-hand axis): Patient performance was normal
at the red, green and blue centers (mean Z-scores of 0.27, 0.31 and
0.03, respectively), but fell signiﬁcantly below normal in the
samples adjacent to the midpoints. Fig. 2b also shows a histogram
indicating what proportion of the patient group was signiﬁcantly
impaired at each test point (right-hand axis). At the red-green
midpoint, 90% of patients were impaired; at the green–blue mid-
point, 40% were impaired, and at the blue-red midpoint, 50% were
impaired. No patient showed signiﬁcant impairment at the red,
green, or blue centers themselves.
Following these observations, we re-analyzed data from the
Simultaneous condition. Our original analysis showed normal ac-
curacy in the patient group collapsed across all colours. In the re-
analysis, we computed the average proportion correct at each
sample point along the spectrum for patients and controls
(Fig. 2c). This analysis revealed a similar pattern to the Delayed
condition: control performance showed small troughs in the red,
green, and (less dramatically) the blue centers, with ceiling per-
formance in between these regions, whereas patients showed
ceiling performance in red, green, and blue centers, with small
troughs between these. We could not compute Z-scores for the
patients, as all controls performed at ceiling at many test points
(which therefore had no variance). Instead we collapsed the data
by computing average performance, for controls and patients, (i) in
each of the Simultaneous and Delayed conditions, and (ii) at each
of three sample steps from the red, green, and blue centers, that is,
at the colour centers themselves, and at one and two sample steps
away from these. These data are shown in Fig. 2d for both Si-
multaneous and Delayed conditions. Analysis of variance for the
control data so tabulated revealed i) a main effect of task, with
performance much better overall in Simultaneous relative to De-
layed conditions (F(1,22)¼45.2, po0.001), (ii) a main effect of the
sample steps from the colour center (F(2,22)¼23.7, po0.001),
with worst performance at the colour center and best at the
furthest step, and (iii) no interaction between these (F(2,22)¼1.1,
p¼n.s.). The same analysis of patient performance showed (i) a
main effect of task with performance much better in Simultaneous
than Delayed conditions (F(1,18)¼70.0, po0.001), and (ii) a main
effect of distance (F(2,22)¼3.7, po0.05), with performance at the
red, green and blue colour centers signiﬁcantly better than per-
formance at colour samples one and two steps away (po0.04 and
po0.03 for contrast to 1-step and 2-step distances, respectively).
As with the control data, the interaction between these factors was
not signiﬁcant (F(2,18)¼0.3, p¼n.s.). In other words, where con-
trols were better at perceiving and remembering colours in re-
gions between the colour centers, patients showed the reverse
pattern.4. Experiment 3: Naming polar and non-polar colours.
Experiment 2 revealed preserved perception and short-term
memory in SD for colours near red, green, and blue centers (where
controls were weakest), but impaired perception and memory for
regions between these areas (where controls were strongest).
What accounts for this pattern? One possibility is that the
knowledge impairm 4 ents in SD do not affect perception or
memory for the “poles” of the opponent-process colour space, butdo degrade perception and memory for colours in between these
poles. Unfortunately Experiment 2 does not fully address this
possibility, for two reasons. First, the stimuli used in this study did
not sample sufﬁciently ﬁnely to discern how perception and
memory fare in the transition from red to green, which includes
the primary colour yellow. Second, the sampling strategy em-
ployed only assessed chromatic hues; it was not possible to assess
perception and memory for the achromatic polar colours black and
white.
Experiment 3 thus sought to test the hypothesis―that polar
colours are preserved in SD―in a different way, by assessing
naming accuracy for polar (primary) and non-polar (secondary)
colours. In prior work, we have shown that colour naming de-
grades in parallel with object naming in this patient population
(Rogers et al., 2007). In this study, we reanalyzed those naming
data by considering basic colour naming performance separately
for primary versus secondary colours.
4.1. Participants
Twelve patients with SD participated in the experiment. All
were diagnosed according to consensus and local criteria for SD;
all had MRI-conﬁrmed cortical atrophy concentrated in the ante-
rior temporal lobes of the brain (as assessed by a senior consultant
neurologist); and all showed the characteristic pattern of impaired
performance on verbal and non-verbal tests of semantic memory,
together with generally good performance on tests of other as-
pects of cognition including tests of visuo-spatial perception and
colour discrimination. Performance on standard neuropsycholo-
gical assessments is shown in Table 2. Control data were not col-
lected as controls routinely perform at ceiling with these ten basic
colour words.
4.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were handed 10 crayons in random order, and
were asked to name the colour of each. Responses were recorded
on a scoresheet by the experimenter. The crayons included the
6 primary or “polar” colours (white, black, red, green, blue and
yellow) and four secondary or “non-polar” colours (brown, gray,
pink and orange). We ﬁrst tabulated, for each of the 10 colours, the
total proportion of patients who produced the correct name. We
then contrasted mean performance for the 6 polar colours with
the 4 non-polar colours in the set.
4.3. Results and discussion
In any naming task, the frequency of the target name is a strong
predictor of accuracy in SD. It is therefore important to consider
the relative frequencies of the 10 basic colour terms assessed. We
ﬁrst considered word frequencies from the classic corpus of Kucera
and Francis (1967) which, though small by today’s standards, we
take to represent word frequencies at a point in time when our
participants were young adults. We also considered word fre-
quency counts from the British National Corpus (BNC), a much
larger and more recent corpus speciﬁc to the UK where this work
was conducted, and drawn from samples of both written and
spoken text (Leech et al., 2001). The log frequencies for the 10
basic colour terms assessed are highly correlated in these two
corpora (r2¼0.81), but have a somewhat different rank ordering.
We thus considered each corpus separately.
The top row of Fig. 3 shows the mean proportion of patients
who produced the correct name for each colour, plotted against
the colour word frequency according to the corpus of Kucera and
Francis (1967). Regardless of word frequency, patients performed
at or near ceiling for all 6 primary (i.e. polar) colours. In contrast,
Table 2
Demographic and neuropsychological data for 12 patients in Experiment 3.
Con-
trolsMean
(SD)
AN WM ATe KH MA JCh JCh SL MS JL DG JH
Demographic
Sex M F M M M M F F F M F F
Age 63 52 65 57 63 58 57 52 68 62 62 58
Education 9 19 19 14 15 10 10 10 17 9 10 9
General neuropsychology
MMSE 28.8 (0.9) 30 24 25 23 29 19 20 24 — 24 20 24
Visual perception
Rey copy 34.2 (1.6) 36 36 36 33 36 31 32 28 — 34 25.5 31
VOSP cubes (/10) 9.3 (1.5) 10 10 10 10 10 10 — 10 4 7 5 10
VOSP dot count (/10) 9.9 (0.3) 10 — 10 10 10 9 — 10 10 10 10 —
Memory
Digit span forward 7.1 (0.9) 7 8 8 6 6 7 6 5 — 7 6 7
Digit span backward 5.4 (1.4) 7 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 — 4 3 4
Rey delayed copy 18.3 (5.2) 26 25 24 13.5 6.5 12.5 12.5 14 — 3 3.5 12
Semantic battery (proportion correct)
Word-picture matching 0.99 (0.01) 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.75 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.50
Naming 0.97 (0.02) 1.00 0.41 0.16 0.77 0.20 0.64 0.06 0.28 0.02 0.17 0.19 0.16
PPT-words 0.98 (0.02) 0.92 0.96 0.85 0.96 0.77 — 0.85 0.73 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.60
PPT-pics 0.98 (0.03) 0.98 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.83 — 0.81 0.87 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.63
Note: Bold indicates impaired performance according to published cutoffs. Figures in shaded cells were taken from an older version of the corresponding test. Dashes indicate
that no data were available for the corresponding test within a year of completing the colour battery. MMSE¼Minnesota Mental-State Exam; VOSP¼Visual Object and Space
Perception; PPT¼Pyramids and Palm Trees Test.
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the most frequent secondary colours (gray and brown) still sub-
stantially worse than even the lowest-frequency primary colour
(yellow). Thus mean performance across patients was reliably
worse for secondary than for primary colours, whether tabulated
across all tested colours or subsets matched for word frequency in
this corpus (po0.001, 2-tailed paired-samples t-test, for both
comparisons).
The bottom row shows the same data plotted against the log
frequencies derived from the BNC. The results are qualitatively
similar, but the two most frequent secondary colour terms ac-
cording to Kucera and Francis, brown and gray, are substantially
less frequent in the BNC corpus. Thus only one primary colour
word, yellow, can be matched in frequency to secondary colour
words in this set. We therefore turned to mixed logistic effects
models to assess whether naming accuracy differs systematically
for primary and secondary colour words.
Models were ﬁtted using the lme4 package in R. We ﬁrst ﬁtted
a model predicting colour naming accuracy on each trial for every
patient as a function of the overall degree of anomia (as assessed
by a standard picture-naming task) and the log word frequency as
estimated from the BNC corpus. Both factors were treated as ﬁxed
effects; separate intercepts and slopes were ﬁtted for each patient,
with patient treated as a random effect. Model statistics are shown
in Table 3: both the severity of the anomia and the log word fre-
quency contributed signiﬁcantly to the prediction of colour-nam-
ing accuracy.
We then ﬁtted a second model adding colour type (primary/
secondary) as an additional ﬁxed effect, and compared the model
ﬁts. Including colour type signiﬁcantly improved ﬁt relative to the
base model (X2¼16.1, po0.001). Signiﬁcance tests on parameters
of the elaborated model show that the effect of word frequency is
no longer statistically reliable when colour type is included. The
analysis thus appears to show a categorical difference in naming of
primary versus secondary colours, over and above any effects of
word frequency. Panel D in Fig. 3 shows the expected accuracy as afunction of overall severity according to this model, plotted se-
parately for primary and secondary colours. The lines show the
expected performance for words with a mean log frequency, while
the shading shows the range expected from the lowest to the
highest frequency word.
Errors consisted mainly of semantic errors in which patients
produced the wrong colour name, including “red,” “pink,” or
“yellow” for orange; “blue” or “brown” for grey; “light red” for
pink; and “yellow” for brown. Thus the naming data are consistent
with, and also extend, the match-to-sample data. In both cases
performance in SD was normal near red, green, and blue centers,
and abnormal for colours between these regions (e.g. orange).
Colours tested in the naming task but not in the match to sample
task also showed that primary colours (including yellow, white,
and black) were preserved whereas secondary colours (brown,
gray, orange and pink) were seriously degraded. Together the re-
sults suggest that colour cognition in SD is largely preserved for
the poles of the opponent-process colour space, but is disturbed
for regions between the poles.5. General discussion
In three tests, patients with SD exhibited a disorder of colour
cognition in which (i) the ability to discriminate similar colours is
preserved but the ability to group discriminably different colours
into categories is disrupted, (ii) perception and short-term mem-
ory are preserved for spectra with peaks around 650 nm (red),
550 nm (green) and 450 nm (blue), but are degraded for spectral
midpoints between these centers, and (iii) basic colour naming is
preserved for primary colours—that is, the chromatic unique hues
red, green, blue, yellow, and the achromatic polar colours black
and white—but is impaired for secondary colours.
To our knowledge, this pattern of disruption has not previously
been observed in any neuropsychological disorder. Cortical
achromatopsia—the loss of colour vision attributable to lesions in
Fig. 3. Performance in the naming task. Top left: Proportion of patients who named each colour correctly plotted against log word-frequency from the Kucera and Franics
norms, for primary colours (green line) and secondary colours (red line). The colour of each square indicates which colour-name is plotted. Top right: Mean and standard
errors across patients for naming of primary and secondary colours considering all 10 colours or just 3 frequency-matched items (from the Kucera and Francis norms) in each
condition. Bottom left: Proportion of patients who named each colour correctly plotted against log word-frequency from the British National Corpus (BNC) norms, for
primary colours (green line) and secondary colours (red line). Bottom right: Mixed-effects model predicted accuracy for naming primary (green) and secondary (red) colours,
as a function of degree of anomia (as assessed by object naming). Lines indicate expected performance at the mean log word frequency across colour names from the BNC
norms. Shading indicates the range of expected performance from the lowest to the highest colour word frequency. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
T.T. Rogers et al. / Neuropsychologia 76 (2015) 276–288 283regions of visual cortex that support processing of colour in-
formation—is a well-known phenomenon but does not produce
the pattern of sparing and impairment seen in the current work
and does not typically involve damage in anterior temporal re-
gions (Bouvier and Engle, 2006). Case studies of colour perception
in patients with aphasic syndromes have been previously re-
ported, but paint a somewhat mixed picture. Some studies have
described patients who appear to lose the ability to name colours,
but with the ability to categorize and otherwise accurately discern
similarities amongst colours relatively intact (e.g. Haslam et al.,
2007). Others have described patients for whom an inability to
name colours or understand colour words is observed coincident
with abnormal colour sorting, but preserved colour discrimination
(Roberson et al., 1999). Still others have suggested that colour
names can be selectively preserved in the context of the general
anomia observed in SD (Robinson and Cipolotti, 2001). A central
challenge for disentangling these ﬁndings is that prior studies
have tended to use quite heterogeneous methods across a variety
of patient aetiologies, making it difﬁcult to identify systematic
trends across tasks and disorders. To our knowledge, the current
work is unique in studying colour cognition across multiple tasks
in a case series of patients with the same underlying cognitive
disorder from the same aetiology.
6.1. Implications for theories of colour cognition
Perhaps most striking are the observed differences between
patients and healthy controls in the match-to-sample task. The
control behavior was largely consistent with classic studies of the
human ability to discriminate different wavelengths of mono-
chromatic light across the visible spectrum (Wright and Pitt, 1934).
Such studies routinely ﬁnd that the just-noticeable-difference (i.e.,
the difference needed to distinguish two stimuli with 75% accu-
racy) between two wavelengths of equal intensity is comparatively
large (about 4 nm) for wavelengths near 460 nm (blue/indigo), 530
nm (yellowish green), and at either end of the visible spectrum(violet/red), and is comparatively small (less than 2 nm) in regions
with local minima between these peaks at 440 (purple), 480
(blue/green), and 575 (yellow/orange) nm (Long et al., 2006;
Wright and Pitt, 1934). Accordingly, we found that controls were
least accurate at ﬁnding the target among neighboring distractors
for nonspectral colour samples with peak wavelengths near red
(650 nm), green (550 nm), and blue (450 nm) colour cen-
ters, and were most accurate at sample points between these re-
gions, both in simultaneous and delayed paradigms. In contrast,
patients with SD performed well in the red, green, and blue re-
gions where controls were poorest, and showed worst perfor-
mance in between these regions where controls were best.
This ﬁnding is of interest partly because it suggests that per-
ception of colour similarity does not depend solely on early visual
processing. Explanations of the hue discriminability curve in nor-
mal human vision are typically based on assumptions about neu-
ronal interactions very early in the visual processing stream, be-
fore visual input even reaches cortex (Pokorny and Smith, 2004).
The pathology in SD certainly does not inﬂuence very early visual
processing (Nestor et al., 2006; Guo et al., 2013), nor is the docu-
mented pattern observed in other varieties of colour agnosias or
cortical achromatopsias (Davidoff, 1991), The implications seem to
be that healthy colour perception proﬁles reﬂect contributions of
cortical processing in relatively anterior parts of the temporal
lobes. What then accounts for these patterns? We here consider
three different possible explanations.
1. The effects arise from colour anomia. One interpretation of the
current ﬁndings is that they reﬂect knock-on effects of a general
anomia. Recent research from a variety of labs has suggested that
colour percepts are partly shaped by knowledge of colour names,
either via learning or through cross-modal feedback from word
representations to percepts (the “label feedback hypothesis”; see
Lupyan, 2012). It is possible to view results from all three studies
as arising from such factors. As previously noted, patients with SD
may fail the Categorization oddball task because they are unable to
retrieve the colour name associated with the target. Though the
Table 3
Logistic mixed effects model ﬁts and comparison.
Model 1 ﬁxed effects B Serr Z po Sig
Intercept 8.8 2.4 3.7 0.001 nnn
Object naming accuracy 3.7 1.6 2.4 0.02 n
Log word frequency (BNC) 2.3 0.6 3.9 0.001 nnn
Model 2 ﬁxed effects
Intercept (Colour type: Primary) 0.3 3.6 -0.1 0.930
Object naming accuracy 4.1 1.6 2.5 0.020 n
Log word frequency (BNC) 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.300
Colour type: Secondary 3.9 1.3 -3.0 0.003 nn
Fit comparisons AIC BIC log lik deviance Sig
Model 1 92 108 -40 80
Model 2 78 97 32 64
Comparison X2 ¼16 po0.0001 nnn
NOTE: Separate intercepts and word-frequency slopes were ﬁt for each patient,
with these treated as random effects. AIC¼Akaike information criterion;
BIC¼Bayesian information criterion; log lik¼model log likelihood.
Fig. 4. Development of short-term memory for colours. Data reported by Petzold
and Sharpe (1998) in their study of the development of colour representations. The
curves show mean spectral distance from the correct choice (ie error) in a 5 s de-
layed match-to sample task conducted with young children (3-6 years old), older
children (9-11) and young adults (22-30). Circles show the location of adult focal
colour judgments for blue, green, and yellow, while bi-coloured lines show the
location of boundaries between these categories. Violet bars indicate standard error
of the mean. As in the current study, performance is worst near the category center
and best near the boundaries. Performance overall improves with age, but the
extent of the improvement is larger near the boundaries than near the center,
consistent with the view that learning and experience more strongly impact re-
presentations of colour near hue category boundaries. Redrawn with alterations
from Petzold and Sharpe (1998) (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.).
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colour perception and memory may be systematically altered
when colour names are lost, by virtue of the loss of re-entrant
feedback from labels that are automatically activated in healthy
cognition. The colour naming data, of course, directly indicate
anomia for colours (coincident with the general anomia that
characterizes the disorder) in which lower-frequency colour
names are more vulnerable than higher-frequency names. The
greater disruption of perception and short-term memory for col-
ours near spectral midpoints might thus arise because these are
precisely the areas where the more vulnerable lower-frequency
colour words have been lost.
Under this interpretation the results are of interest because
they lend support to the still-controversial position that knowl-
edge of colour names inﬂuences colour cognition. There are,however, some problems with this interpretation of our results.
Most obviously, the account does not explain why naming of pri-
mary colours is so much more robust than naming of secondary
colours, over and above effects of word frequency. Additionally,
the impairments in colour-matching documented in Experiment 2
are not observed in patients with colour anomia from other ae-
tiologies (e.g. Roberson et al., 1999; van Zandvoort et al., 2007). If
the current phenomena arise solely because knowledge of colour
words is lost, then it is unclear why different patterns of impair-
ment are observed in other patients with colour anomia. Third, it
is not clear why the loss of colour names at spectral midpoints
would lead to a pattern in which perception and memory are
systematically better at spectral colour centers. To see this, con-
sider the following explanation of the control data. Samples and
distractors near the red, green, and blue centers are perceptually
very similar and all receive the same label. Samples near the
midpoints are perceptually distinct and receive different labels (for
instance, orange, yellow, green). When the sample and distractors
all generate the same label, they are even more difﬁcult to dis-
criminate and it is hard to remember how they differ. When they
all generate different labels, they are easier to discriminate and it
is easier to remember how they differ. Thus performance excels
near the midpoints and is worse near the centers. Patients who
have lost the labels no longer get the beneﬁts of improved dis-
criminability and memory. Such an account explains why patients
are impaired at midpoints, but not why they are better than
controls at colour centers. Since the samples and distractors at the
colour centers all receive the same label, retention of the label
should continue to make these items more difﬁcult to discriminate
and remember.
2. The impairments arise from damage to a ventral temporal region
specialized for representing colour concepts. This proposal accords
with a series of brain imaging studies which together suggest that
ventral temporal regions considerably anterior to the classical
colour-processing occipital regions are engaged whenever parti-
cipants must make difﬁcult judgments on the basis of colour
perception (Beauchamp, 1999; Simmons et al., 2007) or are re-
quired to retrieve the colours of familiar items (Chao et al., 1999;
Chao and Martin, 1999; Kellenbach et al., 2001). To explain such
ﬁndings, Simmons et al. (2007) proposed a region dedicated to the
representation of “meaningful, high-level colour perceptual re-
presentations” (p. 2809) located approximately midway down the
length of the fusiform gyrus (y¼–33 to –38 in Talairach co-
ordinates). If such a center contributes to perception, memory, and
naming of colours, the SD deﬁcits observed here might be caused
by damage to this region.
A full assessment of this hypothesis would require a detailed
study of the relationship between the distribution of atrophy in
individual patients and the extent of their disordered colour cog-
nition. In the current study, although basic structural MRI scans
were of course conducted for diagnostic purposes, more extensive
neuroradiology for some of the cases was either not carried out or
was obtained at time-points well before or after the patients’
participation in these experiments. We thus do not have available,
for a number of the cases, the kind of detailed assessment of the
anterior-to-posterior extent of temporal-lobe atrophy at the time
of the study that would be required to judge whether this hy-
pothesis could account for our results.
It is also worth noting that the hypothesized region for colour
concepts lies on the edge of the ventral temporal region suscep-
tible to signal dropout by virtue of magnetic ﬁeld inhomogeneities
that arise from proximity to the air-ﬁlled sinuses. Without cor-
rection for these inhomogeneities, functional activations that ex-
tend anteriorly down the length of the temporal lobes may appear
to be localized to a more posterior location (Devlin et al., 2000;
Embleton et al., 2010; Lambon et al., 2010). Thus a further
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activation peak.
3. Colour cognition is inﬂuenced by interactions within a grounded
conceptual knowledge system. The third hypothesis, and the one
that we endorse, is that the observed effects arise because general
knowledge about the world is “embodied,” that is, grounded in the
same sensory and motor systems that govern our direct interac-
tion with the environment (Barsalou et al., 2003; Martin, 2007;
Patterson et al., 2007; Pulvermueller, 1999). On such theories,
conceptual knowledge arises from the learned associations among
different kinds of sensory, motor, and linguistic representations.
The concept “stop-sign,” for instance, may include representations
of octagonal shape in ventral temporal cortex; the colour “red” in
area V4; phonological and orthographic codes for the words “stop-
sign” in perisylvian regions; motor plans associated with stop-
signs in parietal and premotor cortex; and learned associations
among these. Many such theories propose that the network is
interactive, so that activation of any of these sensory, motor, or
linguistic representations promotes activation of associated re-
presentations in other modalities (Rogers et al., 2004). Thus the
perceptual, motor, and linguistic representations—including per-
ceptual representations of colour—can be inﬂuenced both by
bottom-up input from sensory systems and by recurrent feedback
from the rest of the semantic network. On this view, the degree to
which different wavelengths of light appear similar depends, in
the healthy system, both upon the structure present in the bot-
tom-up signal and on recurrent interactions with other re-
presentations in the system via learned associations. This idea
accords well with the many examples of knowledge-perception
interactions recently reviewed by Collins and Olson (2014).
In SD, we propose that the inﬂuence of recurrent feedback on
colour percepts is weakened or distorted, causing changes to the
representation of colour in posterior cortex, especially for spectral
regions where structure in the bottom-up signal is least robust
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2007; Patterson et al., 2007; Rogers et al.,
2004). It may be that, in regions of the spectrum corresponding to
primary colours, the cortical states produced by bottom-up input
alone are quite similar to those that arise from recurrent interac-
tions within the healthy system, so that when these interactions
degrade with disease, colour perception and naming is not com-
promised. In contrast, the cortical states that correspond to per-
ception of secondary colours in the healthy system may depend
more upon interactions within the cortical semantic network for
their stability, so that when such interactions degrade, these states
are more prone to drift—thus disrupting naming and altering
perception of the corresponding colours (Goldstone, 2006).
Our reasons for preferring this hypothesis stem from prior
studies of SD showing that, across a variety of disparate cognitive
subdomains, the patients exhibit remarkably similar patterns of
preservation and impairment (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008;
Patterson et al., 2006). Generally speaking, knowledge about sta-
tistical regularities exhibited within a particular modality of re-
ception or expression tend to be spared in the disorder, while
knowledge about properties of familiar items that violate such
regularities tend to be seriously degraded. We have already seen
how, in delayed-copy drawing, patients with SD omit properties
that individuate related items (such as the hump of a camel, which
distinguishes it from other animals) but retain properties shared
by related items (such as the eye of a camel, which is common to
animals). Similar patterns are observed in many other aspects of
behavior. Patients with SD successfully retrieve the colours of
everyday items when these are typical of the domain (e.g. the fact
that bears, like many animals, are brown while cucumbers, like
many plants, are green), but not when they are atypical (e.g. the
fact that ﬂamingos are pink or that carrots are orange; Rogers
et al., 2007). They can accurately recognize words composed oforthographically well-formed letter strings (e.g. ROT), but fail to
recognize words with unusual spellings (e.g. YACHT) and indeed
may choose YOT in preference to YACHT as the real word (Rogers
et al., 2004). They correctly read aloud words with typical spelling-
sound correspondences (e,g., FEW), but very often regularize the
pronunciations of those with atypical correspondences, thus pro-
nouncing SEW as “sue” (Graham et al., 1994; Patterson and Hod-
ges, 1992). They can generate the appropriate past-tense forms of
regular verbs (such as blink - “blinked”), but are impaired with
irregular forms (producing drink - “drinked”) (Patterson et al.,
2001). In object-directed action, patients show disproportionate
loss of unaffordanced action elements (Bozeat et al., 2002).
In many of these subdomains others have argued that the af-
fected behavior—delayed-copy drawing, object recognition, object
colour knowledge, word recognition, reading, spelling, verb in-
ﬂection, and object-directed action—is supported by its own task-
speciﬁc subsystem. Such a position requires, however, that many
otherwise unrelated abilities are all simultaneously affected in
similar ways by pathology in SD. This seems unlikely given the
relatively circumscribed atrophy in the disorder and the additional
observation that other forms of dementia, such as Alzheimer’s
disease, that produce much more widespread brain abnormalities
do not produce the same pattern of dysfunction (Nestor et al.,
2006).
In prior work we have argued an alternative position, that the
ability to retrieve irregular or atypical properties−properties of
familiar items that violate the surface regularities of a given
modality of representation−depends upon interactions between
the modality in question and a more amodal representation of the
item (Patterson et al., 2006). For instance, in the well-known
“triangle” model of word reading, pronunciation of words with
atypical spelling-sound correspondences depends upon input
from the semantic representation of the word, because the direct
pathway leading from orthography to phonology strongly encodes
the systematic correspondences between spelling and sound that
characterize regular words (Plaut et al., 1996). Spelling-sound
pairings that violate this structure are difﬁcult to process within
this pathway and so come to depend more on additional input
from representation of the word’s meaning. Similar models have
been advanced to explain the effects of degraded semantic re-
presentation on memory for exceptional properties or items in the
domains of delayed-copy drawing (Rogers et al., 2004) and verb
inﬂection (Joanisse and Seidenberg, 1999). The models suggest
that, when semantic representations degrade, their inputs to
modality-speciﬁc representations throughout cortex are dimin-
ished or degraded. Since it is the irregular or atypical properties of
items that depend most on this input for their activation, this loss
mainly affects knowledge of such properties. This view thus ex-
plains impairments across many different tasks with reference to
the same underlying cause, and further explains the particular
pattern of deﬁcit observed in each case. Our account of the current
data accords well with this general view.
This view is also consistent with inﬂuential work in the de-
velopment of colour knowledge conducted by Petzold and Sharpe
(1998), who assessed short-term memory for colour samples using
a delayed match-to-sample procedure in young children (3–6
years), older children (9–11), and young adults (22–30). In this
case the stimuli were coloured circles against a white background,
with colours expressed via non-spectral light with a carefully
controlled dominant wavelength. From adult judgments, the au-
thors measured the location of focal examples of blue, green, and
yellow, as well as boundaries between these, and chose samples
spanning the range from the blue/green to the green/yellow
boundary that varied in dominant wavelength while controlling
luminance. The task required participants to choose the sample
match from an array of 16 different colours after a 5 s delay,
Table A1
Parameters for the red, green, and blue colour ﬁlters for target and distractor items in the oddball task. Closest item indicates the Euclidean distance between the target and
the closest distractor in each array. Items in the Categorization and Discrimination conditions are paired such that the minimal parameter distance in the Categorization
condition is always larger than the minimal distance in the paired Discrimination condition. Cat¼Categorization item, Disc¼Discrimination item.
Item no. Condition Target Distractor 1 Distractor 2 Distractor 3 Closest
r g b r g b r g b r g b item
1 Cat 0 128 106 0 101 138 0 59 91 0 101 138 42
2 Cat 137 106 0 89 112 0 0 115 0 58 141 0 48
3 Cat 170 74 93 182 38 125 108 0 119 134 23 96 50
4 Cat 0 104 135 22 101 85 18 101 17 0 132 54 55
5 Cat 20 204 204 27 188 19 22 219 150 17 174 64 56
6 Cat 20 204 204 78 160 18 24 145 16 22 219 150 56
7 Cat 169 225 86 178 162 79 255 216 114 255 119 93 64
8 Cat 153 46 105 181 132 54 139 45 42 196 64 59 65
9 Cat 171 148 27 102 143 35 23 191 134 19 215 44 70
10 Cat 129 169 11 222 203 15 215 67 14 162 104 10 73
11 Cat 33 144 164 83 193 39 45 225 102 28 138 87 77
12 Cat 234 70 174 188 74 56 250 75 90 204 156 61 86
13 Cat 80 150 0 206 20 0 211 194 0 145 94 0 86
14 Cat 46 230 230 68 230 60 25 173 120 118 236 153 106
15 Cat 0 130 190 0 0 190 91 0 228 55 60 255 110
16 Cat 242 202 57 74 182 106 144 238 113 132 185 32 114
17 Cat 132 230 34 230 139 22 230 82 82 230 220 94 115
18 Cat 230 46 230 230 117 91 230 19 79 230 213 64 153
1 Disc 46 99 128 47 119 128 47 119 128 47 119 128 20
2 Disc 56 128 39 31 128 46 31 128 46 31 128 46 26
3 Disc 11 56 110 12 91 115 12 91 115 12 91 115 35
4 Disc 0 24 101 0 59 91 0 59 91 0 59 91 36
5 Disc 128 47 48 128 51 88 128 51 88 128 51 88 40
6 Disc 106 128 21 88 128 60 88 128 60 88 128 60 43
7 Disc 180 161 255 226 168 255 226 168 255 226 168 255 47
8 Disc 27 188 19 17 174 64 17 174 64 17 174 64 48
9 Disc 230 152 129 230 202 132 230 202 132 230 202 132 50
10 Disc 106 230 170 125 230 121 125 230 121 125 230 121 53
11 Disc 181 107 54 196 59 81 196 59 81 196 59 81 57
12 Disc 37 149 0 0 122 35 0 122 35 0 122 35 58
13 Disc 68 230 60 73 230 120 73 230 120 73 230 120 60
14 Disc 33 122 230 40 182 230 40 182 230 40 182 230 60
15 Disc 125 159 16 66 144 14 66 144 14 66 144 14 61
16 Disc 230 213 64 230 117 91 230 117 91 230 117 91 100
17 Disc 225 110 68 233 219 70 233 219 70 233 219 70 109
18 Disc 230 82 82 230 220 94 230 220 94 230 220 94 139
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distance of the participant’s choice from the correct option.
With these ﬁnely controlled stimuli, the authors observed es-
sentially the same pattern noted for control participants in the
current work: across age groups, sample memory was best at the
hue category boundaries and worst near the category centers
(Fig. 4). They also observed, however, improvement with increas-
ing age that was most pronounced near the colour boundaries and
least pronounced near the colour centers. Moreover, the age
groups did not differ in their ability to detect small differences in
dominant wavelength across this range of the spectrum in an
oddball task similar that employed here. The data thus suggest
that learning and experience between young childhood and
adulthood, while not affecting the ability to detect subtle hue
differences, nevertheless shape representations of colour, espe-
cially near hue category boundaries. These developmental patterns
mirror the current data for SD patients, in which dissolution of
knowledge about the world does not affect colour discrimination
but erodes colour perception and memory for regions of the
spectrum near hue category boundaries—that is, for secondary
colours.
The idea that secondary colour categories are more strongly
shaped by interactions with the knowledge system is also con-
sistent both with classic evidence about the constancy of colour
cognition across cultures and languages (Berlin and Kay, 1969;Heider, 1972; Kay, 2005) and with more recent evidence about the
malleability of colour cognition through language and experience
(Goldstone, 2006; Roberson et al., 2004; Roberson et al., 2000).
The six colour categories that appear most robust to semantic
impairment in SD—black, white, red, green, blue, and yellow—are
precisely those that Berlin and Kay (1969) showed are most likely
to be adopted consistently across different languages and cultures.
They also correspond roughly to the poles of the three-dimen-
sional opponent-process colour space, which are thought to be
carried by separate subcortical and cortical channels in the human
visual system (Solomon and Lennie, 2007). Thus the current evi-
dence supports the long-standing view that these colour cate-
gories are inherent in the bottom-up structure provided by our
perceptual systems, and do not depend strongly on learning and
experience. Instead, such effects may have their strongest impact
on colour concepts existing between the poles of the opponent-
process colour space.
In this, the data are consistent with the variety of cross-lin-
guistic and developmental studies showing that linguistic ex-
perience can alter perceptual boundaries between colour cate-
gories (Roberson et al., 2004; Roberson et al., 2000). Indeed, as Kay
and Regier (2003) have noted, such studies appear to show their
principal effects at the boundaries between colour categories. In
contrast, colour foci (i.e., the regions of colour space judged as
“best examples” of a given colour) do not appear to vary with
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with the view that the primary colour centers are strongly shaped
by bottom-up input, but that the perceptual regions between
these centers, and the mappings from these regions to explicit
labels, can be inﬂuenced by learning and experience—that is, by
recurrent interactions within the conceptual knowledge system.
The conclusion most consistent with all of these ﬁndings is that
knowledge does shape perception, but only within limits.7. Author contributions
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Hardware details and stimulus parameters for Experiments 1
and 2.
The LCD monitors employed cold-cathode ﬂuorescent back-
lighting. This technology produces white light with multiple
spectral peaks, bandpass-ﬁltered at each pixel through three im-
mediately adjacent twisted nematic devices (“liquid crystals”).
Each such device serves as a ﬁlter controlling the passage of light
in a given frequency band, and the spectral structure of the
backlight together with the three ﬁlters produce light with sepa-
rately-controllable peaks around 650 nm (red), 550 nm (green)
and 450 nm (blue). When fully open, each ﬁlter permits passage of
light within its bandwidth at approximately equal peak intensities,
and when fully closed each ﬁlter fully blocks passage of light in its
bandwidth. Each ﬁlter is voltage controlled with an 8 bit gate, al-
lowing a total of 255 different states corresponding to 255
monotonically increasing intensities of light passing through each
ﬁlter. The computer software thus speciﬁes colours by directly
setting the state of each of the three ﬁlters at every voxel to one of
255 possible values. For instance, the values 255, 0, 0 would fully
open the 650 nm ﬁlter, allowing passage of light with a single
spectral peak near 650 nm, typically perceived as red. The values
255, 255, 0, would fully open both the 650 nm and 550 nm ﬁlters,
producing light with spectral peaks at both 650 nm and 550 nm,
typically perceived as yellow.
The colour parameter settings used for the target and distractor
items for Experiment 1 are listed in Table A1. For Experiment 2,
the stimuli were generated as follows. The spectrum began with
the 650 nm ﬁlter at each pixel fully open and the other two ﬁlters
fully closed (255,0,0 in the ﬁlter parameter space), a point hen-
ceforth referred to as the “red center.” Colours shifted more to-
ward the blue end of the spectrum were generated by keeping the
red ﬁlter open and opening the green ﬁlter (550 nm) in in-
creasing increments until both it and the red ﬁlter were fully open,
a point henceforth referred to as the red–green midpoint. Shiftsfurther toward the blue end of the spectrum were created by di-
minishing the red ﬁlter until it was fully closed, leaving only the
green ﬁlter fully open (“green center”); then gradually opening the
blue ﬁlter (450 nm) until both green and blue were fully open
(green–blue midpoint). Moving still further toward the blue end,
the green ﬁlter was gradually diminished until it was fully off,
leaving just the blue ﬁlter fully open (“blue center”); and ﬁnally to
generate colours in the violet part of the spectrum, the red ﬁlter
was incrementally opened up until both red and blue were
maximally open (blue–red midpoint), and then the blue ﬁlter was
incrementally reduced until only the red ﬁlter was fully open,
returning to the origin. In this way we created the fully saturated
and luminant spectrum from which samples and distractors for
Experiment 2 were selected as described in the text.References
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